zlataniere

Résumé The Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) is an association governed by Swiss law whose objectives include, inter alia, to draw up regulations and provisions governing the game of football and related matters, and to control every type of football at world level, but also to organise its own international competitions. FIFA is made up of national football associations which are members of six continental confederations recognised by it – which includes the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), an association governed by Swiss law whose principal missions consist in monitoring and controlling the development of every type of football in Europe. As members of FIFA and UEFA, those national associations have the obligation, inter alia, to cause their own members or affiliates to comply with the statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA and UEFA, and to ensure that they are observed by all stakeholders in football, in particular by the professional leagues, clubs and players. In accordance with their respective Statutes, FIFA and UEFA have the power to approve the holding of international professional football competitions, including competitions between football clubs affiliated to a national association (‘interclub football competitions’). They may also organise such competitions and exploit the rights related thereto. European Superleague Company SL (‘ESLC’) is a company governed by Spanish law established on the initiative of a number of professional football clubs with the objective of organising a new European interclub football competition known as the ‘Super League’. The shareholder and investment agreement signed by the project promoters makes the establishment of the Super League subject to approval by FIFA and UEFA as a new competition compatible with their Statutes. Following the announcement of the creation of the Super League, FIFA and UEFA issued a joint statement on 21 January 2021, setting out their refusal to recognise that new competition and warning that any player or club taking part in that new competition would be expelled from competitions organised by FIFA and UEFA. In another announcement, UEFA and a number of national associations reiterated the possibility of adopting disciplinary measures in respect of participants in the Super League, notably excluding them from certain major European and world competitions. In those circumstances, ESLC brought an action before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil no 17 de Madrid (Commercial Court No 17, Madrid, Spain), seeking, in essence, a declaration that those announcements, and also conduct by which FIFA and UEFA and their member national associations might put them into action, were unlawful and harmful. According to that court, FIFA and UEFA hold a monopoly or, at least, a dominant position in the market for the organisation and marketing of international interclub football competitions, and that of the exploitation of the various rights related to those competitions. In that context, it is uncertain as to the compatibility of certain provisions of FIFA’s and UEFA’s Statutes with EU law, most notably Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and also the provisions relating to the various fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty. By its judgment, delivered the same day as two other judgments (1) concerning the application of EU economic law to rules adopted by international or national sporting federations, the Court of Justice, sitting as a Grand Chamber, states that the conditions in which the rules put in place by FIFA and UEFA, concerning, on the one hand, prior approval of international interclub football competitions, the participation of football clubs and players therein, and also the sanctions provided for to accompany those rules, and, on the other, the exploitation of the various rights related to those competitions, may be viewed as constituting abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, as well as an anticompetitive agreement under Article 101 TFEU. The Court also rules on the compatibility of those rules on prior approval, participation and sanctions with the freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU. Findings of the Court The Court begins by setting out three sets of observations. First of all, it observes that the questions submitted by the referring court concern solely a set of rules adopted by FIFA and UEFA on the prior approval of international interclub football competitions and the participation therein of professional football clubs and their players, on the one hand, and the exploitation of the various rights related to those competitions, on the other. Accordingly, the Court is not called upon to rule on the very existence of FIFA and UEFA or on the well-foundedness of other rules adopted by those two federations or, lastly, on the existence or characteristics of the Super League project itself, either in the light of the competition rules or the economic freedoms enshrined in the FEU Treaty. Next, the Court observes that all of the rules about which questions have been referred to it come within the scope of provisions of the Treaty relating to competition law and also those relating to the freedoms of movement. It observes in that regard that, in so far as it constitutes an economic activity, the practice of sport is subject to the provisions of EU law applicable to such activity, apart from certain specific rules which were adopted solely on non-economic grounds and which relate to questions of interest solely to sport per se. The rules at issue in the main proceedings, however, irrespective of whether they originate from FIFA or UEFA, do not come within that exception, since they relate to the pursuit of football as an economic activity. Lastly, as regards the consequences that may be inferred from Article 165 TFEU – which specifies both the objectives assigned to Union action in the field of sport and the means which may be used to contribute to the attainment of those objectives – the Court observes that that provision is not a special rule exempting sport from all or some of the other provisions of primary EU law liable to be applied to it or requiring special treatment for sport in the context of that application. It further recalls that the undeniable specific characteristics of sporting activity may be taken into account along with other elements and provided they are relevant in the application of the provisions of the FEU Treaty relating to competition law and the freedoms of movement, although they may be so only in the context of and in compliance with the conditions and criteria of application provided for in each of those provisions. In the light of those observations and after having noted that FIFA and UEFA must be categorised as ‘undertakings’ for the purposes of EU competition law in so far as they pursue economic activities such as organising football competitions and exploiting the rights related thereto, the Court turns first to the question whether the adoption by FIFA and UEFA of rules on prior approval of interclub football competitions and participation therein, on pain of sanctions, may be held to be abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, on the one hand, and an anticompetitive agreement under Article 101 TFEU, on the other. In that regard, the Court observes that the specific characteristics of professional football, including its considerable social and cultural importance and the fact that it generates great media interest, together with the fact that it is based on openness and sporting merit, support a finding that it is legitimate to subject the organisation and conduct of international professional football competitions to common rules intended to guarantee the homogeneity and coordination of those competitions within an overall match calendar as well as to promote the holding of sporting competitions based on equal opportunities and merit. It is also legitimate to ensure compliance with those common rules through rules such as those put in place by FIFA and UEFA on prior approval of those competitions and the participation of clubs and players therein. It follows that, in the specific context of professional football and the economic activities to which the practice of that sport gives rise, neither the adoption of those rules nor their implementation may be categorised, in terms of their principle or generally, as an ‘abuse of a dominant position’ under Article 102 TFEU. The same holds true for sanctions introduced as an adjunct to those rules, since such sanctions are legitimate, in terms of their principle, as a means of guaranteeing the effectiveness of those rules. Be that as it may, none of those specific attributes makes it possible to consider as legitimate the adoption or the implementation of rules and sanctions provided for by way of adjunct thereto, where there is no framework for substantive criteria and detailed procedural rules suitable for ensuring that they are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. More specifically, it is necessary, in particular, that those criteria and those detailed rules should have been laid down in an accessible form prior to any implementation of the rules at issue. Moreover, in order for those criteria and detailed rules to be regarded as being non-discriminatory, they must not make the organisation and marketing of third-party competitions and the participation of clubs and players therein subject to requirements which are either different from those applicable to competitions organised and marketed by the decision-making entity, or are identical or similar to them but are impossible or excessively difficult to fulfil in practice for an undertaking that does not have the same status as an association or the same powers at its disposal as that entity and which, accordingly, is in a different situation to that entity. Lastly, in order for the sanctions introduced as an adjunct to those rules not to be discretionary, they must be governed by criteria that must not only also be transparent, objective, precise and non-discriminatory, but must also guarantee that those sanctions are determined, in each specific case, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, in the light of, inter alia, the nature, duration and seriousness of the infringement found. It follows that the adoption and implementation of rules on prior approval, participation and sanctions, where there is no framework for those rules providing for substantive criteria and detailed procedural rules suitable for ensuring that they are transparent, objective, precise, non-discriminatory and proportionate, constitute abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. As regards the application of Article 101 TFEU to those rules, the Court observes that, although the stated reasons for the adoption of rules on prior approval for interclub football competitions may include the pursuit of legitimate objectives, such as ensuring observance of the principles, values and rules of the game underpinning professional football, they do confer on FIFA and UEFA the power to authorise, control and set the conditions of access to the market concerned for any potentially competing undertaking, and therefore to determine both the degree of competition that may exist on that market and the conditions in which that potential competition may be exercised. Moreover, the rules on the participation of clubs and players in those competitions are liable to reinforce the anticompetitive object inherent in any prior approval mechanism that is not subject to restrictions, obligations and review suitable for ensuring that it is transparent, objective, precise and non-discriminatory, by preventing any undertaking organising a potentially competing competition from calling, in a meaningful way, on the resources available in the market, namely clubs and players, the latter being vulnerable – if they participate in a competition that has not had the prior approval of FIFA and UEFA – to sanctions for which there is no framework providing for substantive criteria or detailed procedural rules capable of ensuring that they are transparent, objective, precise, non-discriminatory and proportionate. It follows that, where there is no framework providing for such substantive criteria or detailed procedural rules, the rules at issue reveal, by their very nature, a sufficient degree of harm to competition and must, as a result, be held to have as their object the prevention thereof. They accordingly come within the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, without its being necessary to examine their actual or potential effects. In the second place, the Court turns to the question whether the rules on prior approval, participation and sanctions at issue may benefit from an exemption or be held to be justified. In that regard, the Court recalls, first, that certain specific conduct, such as ethical or principled rules adopted by an association, are liable to fall outside the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, even if they have an inherent effect of restricting competition, provided that they are justified by the pursuit of legitimate objectives in the public interest which are not per se anticompetitive in nature and the specific means used to pursue those objectives are genuinely necessary and proportionate for that purpose. It states, however, that that case-law does not apply in situations involving conduct that by its very nature infringes Article 102 TFEU or reveals a sufficient degree of harm as to justify a finding that it has as its ‘object’ the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. Second, as regards the exemption provide for in Article 101(3) TFEU, it is for the party relying on such an exemption to demonstrate that all four of the cumulative conditions required for the exemption are satisfied. Thus, the conduct being examined must, with a sufficient degree of probability, make it possible to achieve efficiency gains, whilst reserving for the users an equitable share of the profits generated by those gains and without imposing restrictions which are not indispensable for the achievement of those gains and without eliminating all effective competition for a substantial part of the products or services concerned. It is for the referring court to determine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties to the main proceedings, whether those conditions are satisfied in the specific case. That being said, as regards the last condition, concerning the maintenance of effective competition, the Court observes that the referring court will have to take account of the fact that there is no framework for the rules on prior approval, participation and sanctions providing for substantive criteria and detailed procedural rules suitable for ensuring that they are transparent, objective, precise and non-discriminatory, and that such a situation is liable to enable entities having adopted those rules to prevent any and all competition on the market for the organisation and marketing of interclub football competitions on European Union territory. Consistently with the Court’s case-law on Article 102 TFEU, abusive conduct by an undertaking holding a dominant position may escape the prohibition laid down in that provision if the undertaking concerned establishes that its conduct was either objectively justified by circumstances extraneous to the undertaking and proportionate to that justification, or counterbalanced or even outweighed by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer. In the present case, as regards, first, possible objective justification, the rules put in place by FIFA and UEFA have the aim of reserving the organisation of any such competition to those entities, at the risk of eliminating any and all competition from third-party undertakings, meaning that such conduct constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, one not justified, moreover, by technical and commercial necessities. Second, as regards the advantages in terms of efficiency, it will be for those two sporting associations to demonstrate, before the referring court, that efficiency gains can be achieved through their conduct, that those efficiency gains counteract the likely harmful effects of that conduct on competition and consumer welfare on the markets concerned, that that conduct is necessary for the achievement of such gains in efficiency, and that it does not eliminate effective competition by removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition. In the third place, as regards the FIFA and UEFA rules relating to the rights emanating from professional interclub football competitions organised by those entities, the Court observes that, given their content, what they objectively aim to achieve in terms of competition and the economic and legal context of which they form a part, those rules are liable not only to prevent any and all competition between the professional football clubs affiliated to the national football associations which are FIFA and UEFA members in the marketing of the various rights related to the matches in which they participate, but also to affect the functioning of competition, to the detriment of third-party undertakings operating across a range of media markets for services situated downstream from that marketing, to the detriment of consumers and television viewers. It follows that such rules have as their ‘object’ the prevention or restriction of competition on the different markets concerned within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, and constitute ‘abuse’ of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, unless it can be proven that they are justified, inter alia in the light of the achievement of efficiency gains and the profit reserved for users. Thus, it will be for the referring court to determine, first, whether the negotiation for the purchase of those rights with two exclusive vendors enables actual and potential buyers to bring down their transaction costs and reduce the uncertainty they would face if they had to negotiate on a case-by-case basis with the participating clubs and, second, whether the profit derived from the centralised sale of those rights demonstrably enables a certain form of ‘solidarity redistribution’ within football for the benefit of all users. In the fourth and last place, the Court holds that the rules on prior approval, participation and sanctions constitute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU. By enabling FIFA and UEFA to exercise discretionary control over the possibility for any third-party undertaking to organise and market interclub football competitions on European Union territory, the possibility for any professional football club to participate in those competitions as well as, by way of corollary, the possibility for any other undertaking to provide services related to the organisation or marketing of those competitions, those rules tend not only to impede or make less attractive the various economic activities concerned, but to prevent them outright, by limiting access for any newcomer. Moreover, the absence of a framework for those rules containing objective, non-discriminatory criteria known in advance does not enable a finding that their adoption is justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest.

noneeeeee siamo dentro a tutti gli effetti.

Ah ora dai i nomignoli all'attuale dirigenza?

Questa sentenza è dedicata a chi credeva che calcio europeo = UEFA.

Esatto. Il bello è che insiste, secondo me non ha capito esattamente di che si sta parlando

non e' uscita da niente.

Declaración institucional del presidente Florentino Pérez NOTICIA.21/12/2023 Desde el Real Madrid acogemos con enorme satisfacción la decisión que ha adoptado el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, que es el encargado de garantizar nuestros principios, valores y libertades. En los próximos días estudiaremos con detenimiento el alcance de esta resolución, pero sí les anticipo dos conclusiones de gran trascendencia histórica. En primer lugar, que el fútbol europeo de clubes no es ni será nunca más un monopolio. Y en segundo lugar, que desde hoy los clubes serán los dueños de su destino. Los clubes vemos plenamente reconocido nuestro derecho a proponer e impulsar las competiciones europeas que modernicen nuestro deporte y atraigan a los aficionados de todo el mundo. En definitiva, hoy ha vuelto a triunfar la Europa de las libertades y hoy también han triunfado el fútbol y sus aficionados. Frente a las presiones que hemos recibido durante más de dos años, se imponen hoy el derecho, la razón y la libertad. Y por ello, el Real Madrid seguirá trabajando por el bien del fútbol. Igual que hace casi setenta años dimos un paso fundamental en la historia del fútbol con la creación de la Copa de Europa, hoy nuevamente tenemos el deber y la responsabilidad de dar al fútbol europeo el nuevo impulso que tanto necesita. Y para ello, seguiremos defendiendo un proyecto moderno, plenamente compatible con las competiciones nacionales, abierto a todos, basado en el mérito deportivo y que impondrá de forma efectiva el respeto al fair play financiero. Un proyecto que traerá sostenibilidad económica para todos los clubes y que por encima de todo protegerá a los jugadores y entusiasmará a los aficionados de todo el mundo. Lo haremos pese a las campañas que hemos sufrido y que, sin duda, se intensificarán desde el día de hoy. Pero nadie dijo que poner fin a un monopolio después de tantas décadas fuera sencillo. Estamos ante la gran oportunidad de mejorar el fútbol europeo de clubes. Un fútbol a la altura del siglo XXI, con una gobernanza transparente, que sepa convivir con las nuevas tecnologías y que vuelva a provocar la pasión y la emoción que realmente necesitan los aficionados. Permítanme que diga a los clubes europeos que estamos ante el comienzo de un nuevo tiempo en el que podemos trabajar en libertad desde el diálogo constructivo, sin amenazas, sin actuar contra nada ni contra nadie y con el objetivo de innovar y modernizar el fútbol para seguir alimentando la pasión de los aficionados. Desde hoy, el presente y el futuro del fútbol europeo están por fin en manos de los clubes, de los jugadores y de sus aficionados. Nuestro destino nos pertenece y tenemos ante nosotros una gran responsabilidad. Este día marcará un antes y un después. Es un gran día para la historia del fútbol y para la historia del deporte.

Inaspettata? L'abuso di posizione dominante era PALESE.

ABBRACCIAMOCI FORTE E VOGLIAMOCI TANTO BENE TANTO BENE

ha vinto la mafia

credo che abbia vinto la mafia

https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_1477137/ streaming

aderire a che dice che erano usciti tutti dice che era morta

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 17 de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 27 May 2021 — European Super League Company, S.L. v Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (Case C-333/21) (2021/C 382/14) Language of the case: Spanish Referring court Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 17 de Madrid C 382/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.9.2021Parties to the main proceedings Applicant: European Super League Company, S.L. Defendants: Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Questions referred 1. Must Article 102 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that that article prohibits the abuse of a dominant position consisting of the stipulation by FIFA and UEFA in their statutes (in particular, Articles 22 and 71 to 73 of the FIFA Statutes, Articles 49 and 51 of the UEFA Statutes, and any similar article contained in the statutes of the member associations and national leagues) that the prior approval of those entities, which have conferred on themselves the exclusive power to organise or give permission for international club competitions in Europe, is required in order for a third-party entity to set up a new pan-European club competition like the Super League, in particular where no regulated procedure, based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, exists, and taking into account the possible conflict of interests affecting FIFA and UEFA? 2. Must Article 101 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that that article prohibits FIFA and UEFA from requiring in their statutes (in particular, Articles 22 and 71 to 73 of the FIFA Statutes, Articles 49 and 51 of the UEFA Statutes, and any similar article contained in the statutes of the member associations and national leagues) the prior approval of those entities, which have conferred on themselves the exclusive power to organise or give permission for international competitions in Europe, in order for a third-party entity to create a new pan-European club competition like the Super League, in particular where no regulated procedure, based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, exists, and taking into account the possible conflict of interests affecting FIFA and UEFA? 3. Must Articles 101 and/or 102 be interpreted as meaning that those articles prohibit conduct by FIFA, UEFA, their member associations and/or national leagues which consists of the threat to adopt sanctions against clubs participating in the Super League and/or their players, owing to the deterrent effect that those sanctions may create? If sanctions are adopted involving exclusion from competitions or a ban on [OR 30] participating in national team matches, would those sanctions, if they were not based on objective, transparent and objective criteria, constitute an infringement of Articles 101 and/ or 102 of the TFEU? 4. Must Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the provisions of Articles 67 and 68 of the FIFA Statutes are incompatible with those articles in so far as they identify UEFA and its national member associations as ‘original owners of all of the rights emanating from competitions … coming under their respective jurisdiction’, thereby depriving participating clubs and any organiser of an alternative competition of the original ownership of those rights and arrogating to themselves sole responsibility for the marketing of those rights? 5. If FIFA and UEFA, as entities which have conferred on themselves the exclusive power to organise and give permission for international club football competitions in Europe, were to prohibit or prevent the development of the Super League on the basis of the abovementioned provisions of their statutes, would Article 101 TFEU have to be interpreted as meaning that those restrictions on competition qualify for the exception laid down therein, regard being had to the fact that production is substantially limited, the appearance on the market of products other than those offered by FIFA/UEFA is impeded, and innovation is restricted, since other formats and types are precluded, thereby eliminating potential competition on the market and limiting consumer choice? Would that restriction be covered by an objective justification which would permit the view that there is no abuse of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU? 6. Must Articles 45, 49, 56 and/or 63 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, by requiring the prior approval of FIFA and UEFA for the establishment, by an economic operator of a Member State, of a pan-European club competition like the Super League, a provision of the kind contained in the statutes of FIFA and UEFA (in particular, Articles 22 and 71 to 73 of the FIFA Statutes, Articles 49 and 51 of the UEFA Statutes, and any other similar article contained in the statutes of national member associations [and] national leagues) constitutes a restriction contrary to one or more of the fundamental freedoms recognised in those articles?

un grande No Mi Esalta.

mi sono innamorato

Lo vorrei ringraziare pubblicamente per aumentare il contatore utenti

"Ma non c'era nessuno in giro" cit